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A startling claim by Farhatullah Babar, former adviser and spokesperson to Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, has reignited debate around the origins of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks.
In his new book, The Zardari Presidency: Now It Must Be Told, Babar alleges that the 2008 Mumbai attacks were a retaliatory response by Pakistan’s powerful military and intelligence establishment to Zardari’s public offer of a ‘no first use’ nuclear policy toward India.
Zardari had made the statement via a satellite interview with journalist Karan Thapar at an Indian media summit in New Delhi. The remark, echoing India’s own no-first-use doctrine, was seen as an unprecedented peace gesture from a Pakistani leader.
However, a deeper examination of timelines and intelligence records suggests otherwise: the 26/11 attacks were already in motion well before Zardari spoke, orchestrated by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) through its terror proxy, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
The ten LeT terrorists who carried out the Mumbai massacre set sail from Karachi on November 21, 2008 aboard the Al Husseini. Zardari’s interview took place the following day, November 22, when the attackers were already approaching India’s western coast.
By November 23, the group hijacked an Indian fishing trawler, the Kuber, and continued toward Mumbai. They landed on the night of November 26, launching coordinated assaults across the city that lasted 60 hours and claimed 166 lives.
Intelligence findings and Pakistani investigations later confirmed that the terrorists were trained and launched from Pakistani soil.
The planning for 26/11 dates back to 2005, when Pakistan’s ISI initiated long-term operations through LeT. The operational phase began in 2006, the same year LeT operative David Coleman Headley began reconnaissance of potential targets in Mumbai.
This period also saw the July 11, 2006 train bombings, which killed 209 civilians — a prelude to the sophistication of 26/11.
By 2008, LeT’s elite cadre, trained by Pakistan Army’s Special Services Group (SSG), was ready. Each attacker carried assault rifles, grenades, and over 3,000 rounds of ammunition, instructed to occupy iconic landmarks — Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, Oberoi Trident, CST station, and Nariman House — and hold out as long as possible to inflict maximum damage.
At the time of the attacks, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, a former ISI Director-General, was Pakistan’s Army Chief. He had overseen ISI operations during the 2006 train bombings and the planning phase of 26/11, giving weight to suspicions that the attacks were a military-intelligence operation rather than a rogue act.
Babar’s narrative indirectly acknowledges this, referring to the “warmongers” within Pakistan’s establishment — a euphemism for the army and ISI officers who maintained control over foreign policy and national security.
The book also recalls how Kayani opposed Zardari’s presidency, preferring former defence minister Aftab Shaban Mirani as successor to General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s ousted dictator.
Pakistan remains the only nuclear state where the military directly controls nuclear weapons. Its “red lines” for nuclear use were outlined in 2002 by Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, then head of the Strategic Plans Division, who listed conventional Indian attacks — territorial occupation, economic disruption, or political destabilization — as triggers.
Babar’s claim that the ISI viewed Zardari’s “no-first-use” stance as betrayal fits into this context — an attempt by the civilian president to dilute military dominance over nuclear and security policy.
However, evidence shows that the ISI’s 26/11 plans predated Zardari’s statement by years, suggesting that the attack was part of a long-standing strategy to destabilize India and derail peace initiatives.
From the 1993 Mumbai bombings to Kargil (1999) and 26/11 (2008), Pakistan’s military has repeatedly used terror proxies as instruments of state policy while shielding itself through deniability.
Even former dictator Pervez Musharraf’s autobiography, In the Line of Fire (2006), tried to absolve the army of its role in nuclear proliferation, claiming shock at AQ Khan’s global smuggling network — a narrative dismissed as implausible by experts and now by Babar himself.
Babar’s book also highlights Zardari’s failed attempts to bring the ISI under civilian oversight and the continuing imbalance between Pakistan’s elected government and its security apparatus.
The ISI was caught off guard by the US Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad (2011) — an event that exposed the agency’s duplicity. The humiliation was followed by a retaliatory attack by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on PNS Mehran airbase, destroying two naval aircraft.
Seventeen years after 26/11, Asif Ali Zardari is once again president — but the script remains unchanged. A new military establishment continues to dominate Pakistan’s domestic politics, diplomacy, and national security.
Babar’s revelations, while politically significant, ultimately reaffirm a familiar truth: in Pakistan, civilian peace gestures rarely survive the ambitions of its military deep state.
The chronology of evidence — from the LeT’s 2005 planning to the attackers’ November 21 departure — debunks the theory that 26/11 was triggered by Zardari’s nuclear outreach.
Instead, it reinforces a long-standing pattern: Pakistan’s military and ISI weaponize terror to sabotage peace whenever civilian leadership attempts reconciliation with India.
As history rhymes once again, Pakistan’s deep state remains unchanged — a power behind the throne that continues to dictate the nation’s wars, peace, and nuclear posture.
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Published: Nov 05, 2025