Why India Became Target of Public Anger in Bangladesh Despite 1971 Liberation Role

India played a decisive role in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, providing military support, shelter to refugees, and diplomatic backing during the Liberation War. Yet, more than five decades later, India has emerged as a central target of public anger in Bangladesh, particularly amid the political unrest of 2024–25. The roots of this resentment lie not in a single event, but in a complex mix of history, politics, geography, and perception.

For years, opposition groups and student organisations in Bangladesh have popularised the belief that former prime minister Sheikh Hasina and New Delhi were inseparable. Her prolonged tenure came to be seen by critics as sustained by Indian political backing, especially after controversial elections in 2018–19 and early 2024, both of which were boycotted or disputed by major opposition forces. India’s endorsement of these electoral outcomes reinforced the narrative that Delhi prioritised stability and strategic alignment over democratic credibility.

This perception gradually transformed India into a symbol of domestic grievances. Economic stress, shrinking political space, allegations of authoritarianism, and frustration with the Awami League were increasingly projected onto India. Opposition rhetoric collapsed internal failures into the idea of “Indian hegemony,” making New Delhi a convenient external antagonist.

Anti-India sentiment has older roots as well. Disputes over river water sharing, particularly since protests in 1976, created early anxieties about India’s dominance as the upstream neighbour. Later, the promotion of “Bangladeshi nationalism” under military rule sought to distance the country from India’s cultural influence. Islamist groups and pro-Pakistan factions, including Jamaat-e-Islami, have historically opposed India due to its role in Bangladesh’s independence and its perceived closeness to Hindu minorities.

Tensions escalated sharply after protests against Narendra Modi’s visit to Bangladesh in 2021, driven by anger over India’s domestic policies and religious sensitivities. The Awami League’s defence of ties with India during these protests further alienated large sections of society, allowing resentment to simmer beneath the surface.

The rupture deepened dramatically in August 2024, when Sheikh Hasina fled to India following violent student-led protests. Her subsequent political statements from Indian soil enraged protesters and the interim government in Dhaka, which repeatedly demanded her extradition. India’s refusal to act on these demands hardened the view that New Delhi was shielding a leader many Bangladeshis held responsible for repression and bloodshed.

Unrest intensified again in December 2025 after the killing of student leader Sharif Osman Hadi, an outspoken critic of both Hasina and India. His death triggered mass protests that quickly merged anti-Hasina anger with open hostility toward India. Allegations that suspects fled across the border, attacks on minorities, and arson targeting media houses further worsened bilateral tensions.

While India maintains that it seeks peace, inclusion, and stability in Bangladesh, public opinion has shifted sharply. Surveys in 2025 showed a steep decline in favourable views of India, alongside growing support for closer ties with China. For many Bangladeshis, India is no longer seen primarily as a liberation ally, but as an overbearing neighbour linked to an unpopular political order.

With elections expected in 2026, New Delhi faces limited and difficult options: extradite Hasina, silence her, maintain the status quo, or seek a third country to host her. None offer an easy path to repairing the deep political and emotional rupture that has turned a historic ally into a focal point of public rage in Bangladesh.